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Connection situations under uncertainty
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Abstract: This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from con-
nection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To
solve such problems, we extend classical solutions from the theory of mini-
mum cost spanning tree games. We study the properties of such solutions
and suggest how to use them under uncertainty conditions.
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1 Introduction
A connection situation takes place in the presence of a group of agents, each
of which needs to be connected directly or via other agents to a source,
where connections are costly and the conﬁguration of links which minimizes
the total cost of connection is provided by a minimum cost spanning tree
(mcst). However, ﬁnding an mcst does not guarantee that it is going to be
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really implemented: agents must still support the cost of the mcst and then
a cost allocation problem must be addressed. This cost allocation problem
was introduced by Claus and Kleitman in 1973 and has been studied with
the aid of cooperative game theory since the basic paper of Bird (1976).
Since that basic paper, many authors have noted that this kind of cost
allocation problems may arise from many diﬀerent physical networks, as tele-
phone lines, highways, electric power systems, computer chips, water delivery
systems, rail lines etc. On the other hand, it seems to us that, in many real
applications, to retrieve the information about the exact cost of all of the
links of a network is often an impossible mission. We argue that it is more
likely to imagine real connection situations where the costs of links are trace-
able at a level of uncertainty, i.e. only the range of the costs is known, and
no probability information on the realization of costs is given.
The problem to ﬁnd an optimal spanning tree on a weighted graph where
edge costs are interval numbers has been widely studied in literature. We
mainly follow the approaches introduced in Yaman et al. (1999; 2001) to
solve the optimization problem. See also Montemanni (2006).
As in the classical case where edge costs are real numbers, also in the
situation where edge costs are intervals of real numbers a cost allocation
problem arises. With the goal to study this kind of cost allocation problems,
in this paper we extend the notion of conservative Construct and Charge
rules, which have been introduced in Moretti et al. (2008), and we study
their properties under uncertainty conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to study a cost
allocation problem arising from connection situation under uncertainty. Suijs
(2003) studied mcst problems in which the connection costs are represented
by random variables. In our paper, costs are not random variables, but just
closed intervals of real numbers with no probability distribution attached.
In Section 2 some preliminaries and basic notations are introduced. In
Section 3 the notion of minimum interval cost spanning tree situation is
presented and the concept of mcst situation associated to diﬀerent scenarios3
is given. Section 4 deals with minimum interval cost spanning tree situations
where a permanent tree exists, i.e. a spanning tree which is of minimum cost
under all possible scenarios. In Section 5 a pessimistic approach to solve the
optimization problem and the consequent pessimistic cost game are studied.
In a similar way, Section 6 deals with an optimistic approach.
Permanent trees and trees selected by the pessimistic and optimistic ap-
proach are ex-ante (before the construction of the optimal tree) choices. Dif-
ferently, Section 7 introduce ex-post procedures to adjust the cost allocations
provided by ex-ante choices. Section 8 concludes with some open problems.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some basic deﬁnitions and results regarding minimum
cost spanning tree (mcst) situations.
An (undirected) graph is a pair < V,E >, where V is a set of vertices
or nodes and E is a set of edges e of the form {i,j} with i,j ∈ V , i  = j.
The complete graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V,EV >, where
EV = {{i,j}|i,j ∈ V and i  = j}.
A mcst situation is a situation where a set N = {1,...,n} of agents is
willing to be connected as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a
service) denoted by 0, based on a given weight (or cost) system of connection.
In the sequel we use also the notation N′ = N ∪ {0}, and w for the weight
function, i.e. a map which assigns to each edge e ∈ EN′ a nonnegative number
w(e) representing the weight or cost of edge e. We denote an mcst situation
with set of users N, source 0, and weight function w by < N′,w > (or simply
w). Further, we denote by WN′ the set of all of the mcst situations < N′,w >
(or w) with node set N′. A path between i and j in a graph < N′,E > is
a sequence of nodes i = i0,i1,...,ik = j, k ≥ 1, such that all the edges
{is,is+1} ∈ E, for each s ∈ {0,...,k − 1}, are distinct edges. A cycle in
< N′,E > is a path from i to i for some i ∈ N′. Two nodes i,j ∈ N′ are
connected in < N′,E > if i = j or if there exists a path between i and j in4
E. A connected component of N′ in a graph < N′,E > is a maximal subset
of N′ with the property that any two nodes in this subset are connected in
< N′,E >.
The cost of a network Γ ⊆ EN′ is w(Γ) =
 
e∈Γ w(e). A network Γ is
a spanning network on S′ = S ∪ {0}, with S ⊆ N, if for every e ∈ Γ we
have e ∈ ES′ and for every i ∈ S there is a path in < S′,Γ > from i to the
source. For any mcst situation w ∈ WN′ it is possible to determine at least
one spanning tree on N′, i.e. a spanning network without cycles on N′, of
minimum cost; each spanning tree of minimum cost is called an mcst for N′
in w or, shorter, an mcst for w. In the following we will denote by ST
N′
the
set of all spanning tree on N′.
The set ΣEN′ of linear orders on EN′ is deﬁned as the set of all bijections
σ : {1,...,|EN′|} → EN′, where |EN′| is the cardinality of the set EN′. For
each mcst situation < N′,w > there exists at least one linear order σ ∈ ΣEN′
such that w(σ(1)) ≤ w(σ(2)) ≤ ... ≤ w(σ(|EN′|)). For any σ ∈ ΣEN′ we
deﬁne the set
K
σ = {w ∈ I R
EN′
+ | w(σ(1)) ≤ w(σ(2)) ≤ ... ≤ w(σ(|EN′|))}.
The set Kσ is a cone in I R
EN′
+ , which we call the Kruskal cone with respect
to σ.
Let N = {1,...,n} and ∆(N) = {x ∈ I RN
+|
 
i∈N xi = 1}. The set
of n-vectors of edges which form a spanning tree on N′ is denoted by EN′,
i.e. EN′ = {(a1,...,an) ∈ (EN′)n|{a1,...,an} ∈ ST
N′
}. Note that the
number of edges which form a spanning tree on N′ is n.
Given an element a = (a1,...,an) ∈ (EN′)n, we denote by a|j the restric-
tion of a to the ﬁrst j components, that is a|j = (a1,...,aj) for each j ∈ N.
Further, for each j ∈ N, we denote by Π(a|j) the partition of N′ such that
Π(a|j) = {T ⊆ N
′|T is a connected component in < N
′,{a1,...,aj} >}.
Let θ ∈ Θ(N′), where Θ(N′) is the family of partitions of N′, and let
T ⊆ N′. If T is a subset of a certain element of the partition θ, we denote5
this element as S(θ,T). A charge system C on N is a set of functions C =




i(a|j) = 0 for each i ∈ S(Π(a|j−1),{0}),
each j ∈ N,
and each a = (a1,...,an) ∈ EN′;
(Involvement property): C
j
i(a|j) = 0 for each i ∈ N \ S(Π(a|j),aj)
each j ∈ N,





i(a|j) = 1 for each i ∈ N,
and each a = (a1,...,an) ∈ EN′.
Based on the notion of charge systems, we may deﬁne special allocation
rules for spanning trees where costs are shared among agents during the edge
by edge construction of the tree. Let C = {C1,...,Cn} be a charge system
on N and Let σ ∈ ΣEN′. We deﬁne the set Eσ
N′ = {a ∈ EN′ : σ−1(a1) ≤
σ−1(a2) ≤ ... ≤ σ−1(an)}. The tree dependent allocation protocol κC,σ
based on C and σ is the map χC,σ : Kσ × Eσ







for each mcst situation w in the Kruskal cone Kσ and each a ∈ Eσ
N′.
According to Moretti et al. (2008), the aggregate contribution of the
charge system C on a|j, for each j ∈ N and for each a = (a1,...,an) ∈ EN′,







C is a conservative charge system if for all j ∈ N and for each pair a,b ∈ EN′,
with Π(a|j) = Π(b|j) we have that AC(a|j) = AC(b|j).
Remark 2.1 Let σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that w ∈ Kσ and let Γ∗ ∈ SP
N′
be a mcst in w. We denote by aΓ∗,σ ∈ Eσ






n } ≡ Γ∗. In addition, the allocation protocol κC,σ( ,aΓ∗,σ),
simply denoted as the map χC,σ : Kσ → I RN, is the Construct and Charge
(CC-) rule w.r.t. C and σ introduced in Moretti et al. (2008).
Remark 2.2 Let σ,σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ and let Kσ and Kσ′ be the respective Kruskal
cones. Let w ∈ Kσ ∩Kσ′. Moretti et al. (2008) proved that if C is conserva-
tive, then χC,σ(w) = χC,σ′(w).
3 Minimum interval cost spanning trees
This work deals with minimum interval cost spanning tree (micst) situations,
i.e. situations where a set N = {1,...,n} of agents is willing to be connected
as cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted by 0,
based on an uncertain weight (or cost) system of connection. Let I(I R+) be
the set of all closed intervals in I R. In the sequel we use also the notation
W for the interval weight function, i.e. a map which assigns to each edge
e ∈ EN′ a closed interval W(e) ∈ I(I R+) representing all possible uncertain
weights or costs of edge e. The interval cost W(e) of each edge e ∈ EN′
will be denoted by [W(e),W(e)]. No probability distribution is assumed for
edge costs. We will denoted by ws(e) ∈ [W(e),W(e)] the realization of cost
of edge e ∈ EN′ in scenario s. We will denote by S the set of all possible
scenarios.
We denote an micst situation with set of users N, source 0, and interval
weight function W by < N′,W > (or simply W). Further, we denote by
IW
N′
the set of all micst situations < N′,W > (or W) with node set N′.
Example 3.1 We consider a micst situation with three agents denoted by 1,
2, and 3 and the source 0. As depicted in Figure 1, to each edge e ∈ E{0,1,2,3}
is assigned a closed interval W(e) ∈ I(I R+) representing the uncertain cost
of edge e. For each scenario s ∈ S we have a realization ws ∈ WN′ such that
ws({0,1}) ∈ [1,9], ws({0,2}) ∈ [6,11], ws({0,3}) ∈ [1,5], ws({1,2}) ∈ [2,4],































Figure 1: An micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W >.
After the decision on which spanning tree must be constructed, agents
face the problem of how to divide the cost of the spanning tree. In the
following, we study this problem using the notion of cooperative cost game.
A cooperative cost game or cost game is a pair (N,c), where N denotes
the ﬁnite set of players and c : 2N → I R is the characteristic function, with
c(∅) = 0 (here 2N denotes the power set of player set N). Often we identify
a cost game (N,c) with the corresponding characteristic function c. A group
of players T ⊆ N is called a coalition and c(T) is called the cost of this
coalition. A payoﬀ vector (or cost allocation) is a vector in I RN.
A particular set, possibly empty, of cost allocations of a cost game (N,c)
is the core of c, which is deﬁned as follows:









We ﬁrst note that to each possible scenario s ∈ S with the associated
realization ws ∈ WN′, corresponds to a mcst game (N,cw) (or simply cws),
which is deﬁned by
cws(T) = min{w
s(Γ)|Γ is a spanning network on T
′}
for every T ∈ 2N\{∅}, with the convention that cw(∅) = 0.
We call a map F : WN′ → I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a
unique cost allocation in I RN a solution. A solution F is a cost monotonic8
solution if for all mcst situations w,w′ ∈ WN′ such that w(¯ e) ≤ w′(¯ e) for
one edge ¯ e ∈ EN′ and w(e) = w′(e) for each e ∈ EN′ \ {¯ e}, it holds that
F(w) ≤ F(w′).
All these notions may be useful to solve the cost allocation problem re-
lated to each scenario s ∈ S, i.e. considering the associated realization
ws ∈ WN′ and the corresponding mcst game cws.
We notice that, in many real cases, once a spanning tree Γ is constructed
under a scenario s ∈ S, all that the agents know about ws is just the cost of
ws(e), for each edge e ∈ Γ. However, in other realistic situations, only the
total cost ws(Γ) is known. In all these circumstances, only few values of cws
are revealed after the construction of a spanning tree Γ.
In following sections we present some criteria useful to solve the deci-
sion making problem on which spanning tree must be constructed in micst
situations. For each criterium, we study some properties of cost allocation
protocols based on charge systems.
4 Permanent trees
According to Yaman et al. (1999), a permanent tree in a micst situation
W ∈ IW
N′
is a spanning tree ΓP which has minimum cost for each scenario





for each scenario s ∈ S and each spanning tree Γ in ws.
Proposition 4.1 Let W ∈ IW
N′
and let ΓP be a permanent tree in W
and let C = {C1,...,Cn} be a conservative charge system on N. Then, the
following assertions hold:
(i) κC,σ(ws,aΓP,σ) = χC,σ(ws) for each s ∈ S and each σ ∈ ΣEN′ such that
ws ∈ Kσ;9
(ii) χC(ws) = χC,σ(ws) = χC,σ′(ws) ∈ Core(cws) for each s ∈ S and each
σ,σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ such that ws ∈ Kσ ∩ Kσ′;
(iii) χC
i (ws) ≤ κ
C,σ
i (ws,aΓ,σ) for all i ∈ N, Γ ∈ ST
N′
, s ∈ S and each
σ ∈ ΣEN′ such that ws ∈ Kσ.
Proof Assertion (i) directly follows by Remark 2.1 and relation (3), which
means that ΓP is a mcst in ws, for each s ∈ S.
Equalities in assertion (ii) follow by Remark 2.2. Moretti et al. (2008)
showed that an allocation provided by a conservative CC-rule in a mcst
situation w ∈ WN′ belongs to the core of the game cw. So, assertion (ii) is
proved.
Now, to prove (iii), let Γ ∈ ST
N′
, s ∈ S and σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that
ws ∈ Kσ. Consider a mcst situation ˜ w ∈ WN′ such that
˜ w(e) =
 





s(e) ≤ ˜ w(e) (5)
for each e ∈ EN′. Moreover, Γ is a mcst in ˜ w.
Let ˜ σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that ˜ w ∈ K˜ σ. By Remark 2.1 we have
κ
C,˜ σ( ˜ w,a
Γ,˜ σ) = χ
C( ˜ w). (6)




i for each i ∈ N. Then, by
relation (1) we have
κ
























i (˜ w) = κ
C,˜ σ
i ( ˜ w,a





where the inequality follows from relation (5) and the fact that conservative
CC-rules are cost monotonic (see Moretti et al. (2008), Tijs et al. (2006)),10
and the equalities follow from relations (6) and (7), respectively.
For each W ∈ IW
N′
, Yaman et al. (1999) proved that a spanning tree
Γ ∈ ST
N′
in W is a permanent tree if and only if Γ is a mcst under a sce-
nario ˘ s ∈ S such that w˘ s(e) = W(e) for each e ∈ Γ and w˘ s(e) = W(e) for
each e ∈ EN′ \ Γ. We use this result to provide an example where a special
conservative Construct and Charge rule, the P-value (Branzei et al. (2004)),
is used to share the cost of a permanent tree among agents.
Example 4.1 Consider the set of functions ˆ C = { ˆ C1,..., ˆ Cn} on N such





          
          
1
|S(Π(a|j−1),{i})| − 1
|S(Π(a|j),{i})| if 0 / ∈ S(Π(a|j),aj)
1
|S(Π(a|j−1),{i})| if {0,i} ⊆ S(Π(a|j),aj)
and 0 / ∈ S(Π(a|j−1),{i}),
0 otherwise,
(9)
for each i ∈ N. Moretti et al. (2008) proved that ˆ C is a conservative charge
system. They also proved that the conservative CC-rule χ
ˆ C equals the P-
value for mcst situations (Branzei et al. (2004), Feltkamp et al. (1994),
Berga˜ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2007)).
Consider the micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W > depicted in Figure 2.
The unique permanent tree in W is ΓP = {{0,1},{0,3},{1,2}}. Let s ∈ S
and let σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that ws ∈ Kσ. By Proposition 4.1 we have that
χ
ˆ C(ws) = κ
ˆ C,σ(ws,aΓP,σ). More precisely, we have that χ
ˆ C
1(ws) = ws({0,1}),










































Figure 2: An micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W > and the related permanent
mcst (thicker lines).
5 A pessimistic approach
Given a micst situation W ∈ IW
N′
and a spanning tree Γ in W, an absolute
worst case scenario s∗
Γ for Γ is a scenario in which the cost of Γ is the
maximum. In formula, s∗
Γ ∈ argmaxs∈S ws(Γ). It follows from this deﬁnition
that in an absolute worst case scenario for a given spanning tree Γ the costs of
all edges e ∈ Γ are ﬁxed at their upper bounds and the costs of the remaining
edges can assume any value in their intervals.
A spanning tree ΓA in W whose cost is the minimum under absolute worst
case scenarios is called, according to Yaman et al. (1999, 2001), absolute
robust spanning tree in W, i.e. ΓA ∈ argminΓ∈ST N′ maxs∈S ws(Γ). In order to
study the cost allocation problem arising from a micst situation W ∈ IW
N′
,
we introduce the notion of pessimistic spanning tree game (N,cA
W) (or simply
cA








Γ is an absolute worst case scenario for Γ}
for every T ∈ 2N\{∅} with the convention that cA
W(∅) = 0. The following
proposition provides an interesting property of allocation protocols based on
charge systems when the pessimistic spanning tree game is considered.
Proposition 5.1 Let W ∈ IW
N′
, let ΓA be an absolute robust spanning
tree in W and let s∗
ΓA be an absolute worst case scenario for ΓA. Let C =














Proof Consider the scenario in which all edge costs are at their upper
bounds. The set of minimum spanning trees under this scenario is exactly
the set of absolute robust spanning trees (see e.g. Yaman et al. (1999)).
Then ΓA is a mcst for w
s∗
ΓA ∈ WN′, where w
s∗
ΓA(e) = W(e) for each edge






We conclude the proof with the remark that the allocation provided by
a conservative CC-rule in a mcst situation w ∈ WN′ belongs to the core of
the game cw (Moretti et al. (2008)).
According to this pessimistic approach, it is also reasonable to expect that
each agent i ∈ N would support the construction of a spanning tree Γ which
makes minimum the cost allocated to agent i in an absolute worst case sce-
nario. Next proposition shows that if conservative CC-rules are adopted,
then such a tree Γ coincides with an absolute robust spanning tree ΓA.
Proposition 5.2 Let W ∈ IW
N′
and let ΓA be an absolute robust spanning
tree in W and let s∗
ΓA be an absolute worst case scenario for ΓA. Let C =
{C1,...,Cn} be a conservative charge system on N and let σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such
that w
s∗













for all i ∈ N and Γ ∈ ST
N′
, where s∗
Γ is an absolute worst case scenario for
Γ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that ws∗
Γ ∈ Kσ′.
Proof Let Γ ∈ ST
N′
be such that Γ  = ΓA and let s∗
Γ ∈ S be an absolute

















for each i ∈ N, where σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that ws∗
Γ ∈ Kσ′.






























By cost monotonicity of χC we have that
χ
C





for each i ∈ N.















i (˜ w). (17)





















Suppose that there is agreement among the players about the allocation
protocol to be used. The property for allocation protocols based on conser-
vative charge systems which is stated by Proposition 5.2, captures a condition
for the “stability” of the decision to construct an absolute robust spanning
tree: no group of pessimistic agents has any incentive to move from an abso-
lute robust spanning tree to another spanning tree. The following example
illustrates this property on a particular instance.14
Example 5.1 Consider the micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W > depicted in
Figure 1. Note that in this micst situation W there are no permanent trees.
The unique absolute robust spanning tree in W is ΓA = {{0,3},{1,3},
{1,2}}. Let s∗
ΓA be an absolute worst case scenario for ΓA. Then, w
s∗
ΓA =
W(e) for each e ∈ EN′. The corresponding pessimistic spanning tree game
cA
W is given in Table 2.
T {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
cA
W(T) 9 11 5 13 8 11 12
Table 1: Pessimistic spanning tree game cA
W corresponding to the micst sit-
uation W depicted in Figure 1.
Consider again the conservative charge system of Example 4.1 and the re-
lated conservative CC-rule χ








































According to Proposition 5.2, there are no Γ ∈ ST
N′









Γ is an absolute worst case
scenario for Γ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that ws∗
Γ ∈ Kσ′.
6 An optimistic approach
Following a similar line as in Section 5, given a micst situation W ∈ IW
N′
and a spanning tree Γ in W, we deﬁne an absolute best case scenario s◦
Γ
for Γ, as a scenario in which the cost of Γ is the minimum. In formula,
s◦
Γ ∈ argmins∈S ws(Γ). A spanning tree in W whose cost is the mini-
mum under the absolute best case scenarios is denoted by ΓB, i.e. ΓB ∈
argminΓ∈ST N′ mins∈S ws(Γ).
For each micst situation W ∈ IW
N′
, we may deﬁne the optimistic span-15
ning tree game (N,cB
W) (or simply cB








Γ is an absolute best case scenario for Γ}
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅} with the convention that cB
W(∅) = 0.
Proposition 6.1 Let W ∈ IW
N′
, let ΓB ∈ argminΓ∈ST N′ mins∈S ws(Γ) and
let s◦
ΓB be an absolute best case scenario for ΓB. Let C = {C1,...,Cn} be a
charge system on N and let σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that w
s◦









Proof Consider the scenario in which all edge costs are at their lower bounds.
The set of minimum spanning trees under this scenario is exactly the set of
spanning trees whose cost is the minimum under the absolute best case sce-
narios. Then ΓB is a mcst for w
s◦
ΓB ∈ WN′, where w
s◦
ΓB(e) = W(e) for each
edge e ∈ EN′. The proof follows as the proof of Proposition 5.1.
Similar to Proposition 5.2, we may claim the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2 Let W ∈ IW
N′
, let ΓB = argminΓ∈ST N′ mins∈S ws(Γ) and
let s◦
ΓB be an absolute best case scenario for ΓB. Let C = {C1,...,Cn} be a
















for all i ∈ N and each Γ ∈ ST
N′
, where s◦
Γ is an absolute best case scenario
for Γ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that ws◦
Γ ∈ Kσ′.
Proof Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.2.
Example 6.1 Consider the micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W > depicted in
Figure 1.16
T {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
cB
W(T) 1 6 1 3 2 1 2
Table 2: Optimistic spanning tree game cB
W corresponding to the micst situ-
ation W depicted in Figure 1.
Let ΓB = {{0,1},{0,3},{2,3}} and let s◦
ΓB be an absolute best case sce-
nario for ΓB. Note that w
s◦
ΓB(ΓB) = minΓ∈ST N′ mins∈S ws(Γ) = 2. The
corresponding optimistic spanning tree game cB
W is given in Table 2.
Consider again the conservative charge system of Example 4.1 and the re-
lated conservative CC-rule χ































According to Proposition 5.2, there are no Γ ∈ ST
N′









Γ is an absolute best case
scenario for Γ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that ws◦
Γ ∈ Kσ′.
Remark 6.1 Let W ∈ IW
N′
be such that ΓP is a permanent tree in W.
Then ΓA = ΓB = ΓP.
7 Cost allocation problem after realizations
Let W ∈ IW
N′
. If all the agents in N decide to adopt the pessimistic
approach, then they will construct the spanning tree ΓA in W. On the other
hand, if they decide to adopt the optimistic approach they will construct the
spanning tree ΓB in W. Using the pessimistic approach, if scenario s ∈ S
is realized, then the saving w
s∗
ΓA(ΓA) − ws(ΓA) ≥ 0 should be redistributed
among agents. Using the optimistic approach, if scenario s ∈ S is realized,
then the extra cost ws(ΓB) − w
s◦
ΓB(ΓB) ≥ 0 should be reallocated among
agents.
Suppose that an allocation protocol based on a conservative charge sys-
tem C = {C1,...,Cn} is used and let ΓA be the spanning tree which is17
constructed, according to the pessimistic approach, under scenario s ∈ S.
We distinguish two cases:
1.A) the cost of ws(e) is known, for each e ∈ ΓA. Then a reasonable way to
share the saving w
s∗
















where σ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that w
s∗
ΓA ∈ Kσ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that
ws ∈ Kσ′.
2.A) only the total cost ws(ΓA) is known. Let σ ∈ ΣEN′ be such that
w
s∗
ΓA ∈ Kσ. In order to allocate the cost saving w
s∗
ΓA(ΓA) − ws(ΓA),





























The taxation problem related to the optimistic approach, after the spanning
tree ΓB is constructed, is very close to lines above. We distinguish again two
cases:
1.B) the cost of ws(e) is known, for each e ∈ ΓB. Then the extra cost to
be divide now is ws(ΓB) − w
s◦
















where σ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that w
s◦
ΓB ∈ Kσ and σ′ ∈ ΣEN′ is such that
ws ∈ Kσ′.
1In this case it is possible to look at the saving allocation problem as a bankruptcy
problem where each agent claims the share of savings necessary to null his/her previ-


















. Note that allocation pro-
vided by relation (20) corresponds to the proportional rule (Curiel et al. (1987)) for
bankruptcy problems.18
2.B) only the total cost ws(ΓB) is known. Similar to point (2.A), in this
case the extra cost ws(ΓB) − w
s◦
ΓB(ΓB) ≥ 0 is divided proportionally
























for each i ∈ N.
Example 7.1 Consider the micst situation < {0,1,2,3},W > depicted in
Figure 1. Note that in this micst situation W there are no permanent trees.
Consider again the conservative charge system of Example 4.1 and the related
conservative CC-rule χ
ˆ C. Suppose that a scenario s ∈ S is realized and that
the associated mcst situation ws is depicted in Figure 3. Note that ws(ΓA) = 9
and ws(ΓB) = 10. The allocations of the saving w
s∗































Figure 3: The mcst situation < {0,1,2,3},ws > realized under scenario s.
3 computed according to (19) and (20) and the allocations of the extra cost
ws(ΓB) − w
s◦
ΓB(ΓB) = 10 − 2 = 8 computed according to (21) and (22) are
shown in Table 3.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we cope with uncertainty in cost allocation problems arising
from connection situations. Basically, we deal with mcst situations where
costs are intervals and agents may act optimistically or pessimistically.19










































12 − 9) = 23
24
∆B 2 − 1 = 1 4 − 1
2 = 7
















10 − 2) = 2
Table 3: Allocations of savings (∆A and PROP A) and of extra costs (∆B
and PROP B) after the realization of scenario s.
In the sequel, we brieﬂy introduce a more complex problem as a possible
topic for further research: how to deal with micst situations where not all
the agents follow the same (pessimistic or optimistic) approach to make the
decision on which spanning tree must be realized?
In theory of decisions under uncertainty, it is well known the Hurwicz’s
criterion (see Wald (1950)), giving to a decision of a single decision maker a
value which is a weighted sum of the worst (pessimistic) and best (optimistic)
possible outcomes, where the weight is represented by an α which is known
as an index of pessimism / optimism. How to determine such an α index
for a single decision maker in an uncertain situation is a diﬃcult task. In
micst situations, things are much more complicated by the presence of n >
1 agents, and the related problem to ﬁnd n, possibly diﬀerent, indices of
pessimism/optimism. In addition, even if such α1,...,αn are given, it is not
clear how this information may help to chose and realize an optimal spanning
tree.
We ﬁnally remark that, to take the decision on whether to cooperate
or not, the pessimistic spanning tree game cA
W and the optimistic spanning
tree game cB
W set the bounds of the cost games that would be interesting to
consider in a micst situation W ∈ IW
N′
where agents have diﬀerent levels of
pessimism/optimism. These bounds may be given in terms of interval cost20
games (Branzei, et al. (2003), Alparslan G¨ ok et al. (2008)), i.e. deﬁning the
corresponding micst game cW = [cA
W,cB
W]. The model of cooperative interval
games was ﬁrstly introduced in Branzei, et al. (2003) to model bankruptcy
situations under interval uncertainty of claims. The theory of cooperative
interval games has been recently developed. We refer here to Alparslan G¨ ok
et al. (2008), Alparslan G¨ ok et al. (2008a; b; c; d).
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